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ON THE ALLEGED SIMPLICITY OF IMPURE PROOF
ANDREW ARANA
ABSTRACT. Roughly, a proof of a theorem, is “pure” if it draws only onwhat is “close” or “intrinsic”
to that theorem. This article considers the contention that impure proofs, drawing on means
“distant” or “foreign” to what is being proved, are generally simpler than pure proofs. After
clarifying this claim, evidence for it from proof theory is assembled. It is shown that this evidence
does not support the claim.
Roughly, a proof of a theorem, is “pure” if it draws only on what is “close” or “intrinsic” to that
theorem. Mathematicians employ a variety of terms to identify pure proofs, saying that a pure
proof is one that avoids what is “extrinsic”, “extraneous”, “distant”, “remote”, “alien”, or “foreign”
to the problem or theorem under investigation. In the background of these attributions is the
view that there is a distance measure (or a variety of such measures) between mathematical
statements and proofs. Mathematicians have paid little attention to specifying such distance
measures precisely because in practice certain methods of proof have seemed self-evidently
impure by design: think for instance of analytic geometry and analytic number theory. By
contrast mathematicians have paid considerable attention to whether such impurities are a good
thing or to be avoided, and some have claimed that they are valuable because generally impure
proofs are simpler than pure proofs. This article is an investigation of this claim, formulated
more precisely by proof-theoretic means. After assembling evidence from proof theory that
may be thought to support this claim, we will argue that on the contrary this evidence does not
support the claim.
1. THE PURITY DEBATE IN OVERVIEW
A purity constraint, restricting proofs of theorems to what is “close” or “intrinsic” to that
theorem, requires an account of how the distance between proof and theorem is to be measured.
Two such measures of distance are what we have called “elemental” and “topical” distance. A
proof is elementally close to a theorem if the proof draws only on what is more elementary or
simpler than the theorem (cf. [Arang]). A proof is topically close to a theorem if the proof draws
only on what belongs to the content of the theorem, or what we have called the topic of the
theorem (cf. [DA11] and [AM12]). Each of these distance metric induces a purity constraint,
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viz. elemental purity and topical purity. In these articles cases from mathematics have been
presented that make evident the importance of these constraints in the history of mathematics
through the present.
Once a purity constraint has been identified, we can ask whymathematicians value proofs that
obey such a constraint. The basic case for preferring elementally pure proofs over elementally
impure proofs, made in [Arang], is that elementarily pure proofs make the most ecient use of
the information at the disposal of a given investigator (e.g. a student who knows little more
than what a problem asks to be done). By contrast, in [DA11] the case is made that pure proofs
give better reason to believe that the statement whose proof is sought has been proved, rather
than some other, perhaps closely related, statement. This analysis takes a “vectorial” conception
of mathematical investigation, in which the success of a proof is determined by the extent to
which it is directed at exactly the intended statement. A proof may succeed as a proof of some
dierent statement while failing as a proof of the statement towards which it was intended to
be directed.
By contrast, impure proofs have been judged valuable on account of their illuminating
previously unseen connections. For example, Kreisel has written:
But also there is the void created by simply not saying out loud what (knowledge)
is gained by impure proofs, for example by analytic proofs in number theory:
knowledge of relations between the natural numbers and the complex plane or, more
fully, between arithmetic and geometric properties. It is precisely this knowledge
which provides eective new means of checking proofs: if this conflicts with
some ideal of rigour, so much the worse for the ideal (which is being tested). (Cf.
[Kre80], p. 167)
Additionally, it is a technical feat to use evidently “distant” methods to solve a problem at
hand. In a way that is what is so impressive about them. We wonder how it is that, for instance,
complex analysis can be brought to bear on arithmetic. and we are struck that this is possible.
Whereas when seeking a pure proof, the search space is constrained, and so the strikingly distant
connections characteristic of impurity cannot arise.
This constraint of the search space can be thought to be an advantage in proof, since the variety
of considerations that can be brought to bear on the directing problem or theorem includes
only a fraction of all the possible considerations that might otherwise be tried. Additionally,
one might think that the “closeness” of proof to theorem would engender other justificatory
eciencies, since such proofs will avoid what would seem from outside the practice to be
extraneous or “roundabout”.
However, there is a strand of theorizing onmathematics that emphasizes the opposite, stressing
the simplicity of impure proof in comparison with pure proof. Such claims have been made, for
instance, on behalf of analytic geometry and of complex analysis in real arithmetic and analysis.
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Let us consider these claims in further detail now, so that we can more precisely formulate and
evaluate theses concerning the simplicity of impure proof relative to pure proof.
2. SIMPLICITY AND IMPURITY IN MATHEMATICAL PRACTICE
Since the seventeenth century analytic methods have been viewed by many as a source
of impurity in geometry, in contrast to the coordinate-free “synthetic” methods typified by
Euclidean geometry. Descartes canonized a procedure for solving geometrical problems as
follows: first express the problem by algebraic equations, then solve these equations by algebraic
manipulations, and finish by translating these algebraic solutions back into geometrical terms.
He lauded this method for making it “easy” [aisé] to find constructions, though he noted that
sometimes the method requires “dexterity” [adresse] in order to find “short and simple” [courtes
et simples] constructions.1 Note that this Descartes here distinguishes two types of simplicity:
the simplicity of discovering a solution to a problem, and the simplicity of the construction itself.
This distinction will recur and we will return to it shortly.
In contrast with Descartes, some mathematicians have judged such use of algebra in geometry
to be “rather far” from the problems at hand, and thus impure. Consider for example the
following passage of Newton:
Equations are Expressions of Arithmetical Computation, and properly have
no Place in Geometry, except as far as Quantities truly Geometrical (that is,
Lines, Surfaces, Solids, and Propositions) may be said to be some equal to others.
Multiplications, Divisions, and such sort of Computations, are newly received
into Geometry, and that unwarily, and contrary to the first Design of this
Science.. . .Therefore these two Sciences ought not to be confounded. The
Antients did so industriously distinguish them from one another, that they
never introduced Arithmetical Terms into Geometry. And the moderns, by
confounding both, have lost the Simplicity in which all the Elegancy of Geometry
consists. (Cf. [New20], p. 119–20)
Newton spelled out the type of geometric simplicity he sought in the following passage:
Men of recent times, eager to add to the discoveries of the ancients, have united
specious arithmetic [i.e., algebra] with geometry. Benefitting from that, progress
has been broad and far-reaching if your eye is on the profuseness of output but
the advance is less of a blessing if you look at the complexity of its conclusions. For
these computations, progressing by means of arithmetical operations alone, very
often express in an intolerably roundabout way quantities which in geometry
1Cf. [Des37], p. 351, though statements of this sort are found throughout La géométrie. For more on the simplicity
of the Cartesian method in geometry, cf. [Ara16], §2, and [Mar10].
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are designated by the drawing of a single line. (cf. [New71], p. 421; translation
from [Gui09], p. 77)
Thus Newton identified the impurity of algebra in geometry as detracting from the simplicity
of geometrical reasoning that ancient works had exemplified.
Newton’s views would come to seem rather peculiar, as the power of the Cartesian method
became increasingly evident (cf. [Pyc97] and [Gui09]). This power was characterized by Colin
MacLaurin, a contemporary and expositor of Newton, as follows:
The improvements that have been made by [analytic methods], either in geom-
etry or in philosophy, are in great measure owing to the facility, conciseness,
and great extent of the method of computation, or algebraic part. (cf. [Mac42],
Book 2, p. 163)
Similarly, Lagrange and Klein emphasized the utility of algebraic methods in geometry. La-
grange wrote:
As long as algebra and geometry have been separated, their progress has been
slow and their usage limited; but when these two sciences are reunited, they
lend each other strength and march onward together at a rapid pace toward
perfection.2
Along the same lines, Klein wrote:
As a matter of principle, we have always availed ourselves of the aids of analysis,
and in particular of the methods of analytic geometry. Hence we shall here
again assume a knowledge of analysis, and we shall inquire how we can go, in the
shortest way, from a given system of axioms to the theorems of analytic geometry. This
simple formulation is, unfortunately, rarely employed, because geometricians
often have a certain aversion to the use of analysis, and desire, insofar as possible,
to get along without the use of numbers. (Cf. [Kle53], p. 160)
While MacLaurin, Lagrange and Klein were clearly promoting the gain in simplicity aorded
by algebra in geometry, these passages leave it unclear whether they intended to promote the
gain it aords in producing work that is simple to verify once located, or in the discovery of
geometric results in the first place. Detlefsen has drawn attention to this distinction, identifying
the former type of simplicity as verificational simplicity and the latter as inventional simplicity
(cf. [Det90], p. 376 and [Det96], p. 87). Verificational simplicity measures the simplicity of
determining whether a given proof is a proof at all; thus it measures the simplicity of confirming
the validity of the deductions of a given proof. By contrast, inventional simplicity measures the
simplicity of discovering a proof of a given statement. MacLaurin’s remarks on the simplicity
of algebraic methods in geometry do not seem to be sensitive to this distinction.
2Cf. [Lag76], p. 271. For a detailed historical investigation of Lagrange’s views on purity in his algebraic work, cf.
[FP11].
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By contrast withMacLaurin, Lagrange and Klein, d’Alembert claimed explicitly that algebraic
methods in geometry aord both types of simplicity. Firstly, he remarked of ancient geometrical
works “that almost no one reads them with the ease [facilité] given by algebra in reducing their
demonstrations to a few lines of calculation” (cf. [d’A51], p. 551). He thus stressed the gain
in verificational simplicity that algebraic considerations can bring to geometrical proof. He
went on to remark, though, that these considerations enable us to “arrive nearly automatically
at results giving the theorem or the problem that we sought, which otherwise we would not
have gotten or would only have gotten with much eort.” (Ibid.) That is, he also stressed that
our ability to discover results in geometry is improved when we make use of algebraic methods
(though he also noted exceptions to this, in particular when trigonometric expressions were
involved).
We find such claims regarding the simplicity of impure methods also in discussion of the
application of complex analysis to real analysis, algebra and arithmetic. One prominent example
of such application was in the theory of equations. Algebraists since Cardano had sought exact
solutions in finite terms to cubic polynomial equations with rational coecients having three
real roots, and were dismayed to discover that this seemed to require using imaginary numbers.
This is an apparent impurity for a problem concerning just real algebra. The casus irreducibilis,
as this is known, spurred numerous, unsuccessful attempts to avoid imaginary numbers, even
leading to a prize question in 1781 from the scientific academy in Padua.3
Another such example is the prime number theorem, a result concerning the distribution
of prime numbers among the natural numbers that gives a precise estimate of the number
of primes less than a given natural number.4 It was proved by Hadamard (cf. [Had96]) and,
independently, de la Vallée Poussin (cf. [dlVP96]) using complex analysis in 1896. Their use
of imaginary numbers to solve a number-theoretic problem was judged impure by many ,
spurring work that led to the “elementary” proofs of Selberg and Erdős in 1949 that avoid
reference to imaginary numbers (cf. [Sel49] and [Erd49]). The elementary proofs have been
viewed as more pure than the complex analytic proofs; as Granville recently put it, “A simple
question like ‘How many primes are there up to x?’ deserves a simple answer, one that uses
elementary methods rather than all of these methods of complex analysis, which seem rather far
from the question at hand.”5
As with the application of algebra to geometry, these allegedly impure solutions have been
promoted for their alleged eciency. In a famous remark, Hadamard observed that “the shortest
3The prize question is described in [Rid82], p. 4. Otto Hölder showed in 1892 that there is no exact solution in
finite terms to cubics in the casus irreducibilis that avoids imaginary numbers; cf. [Höl92]. For a more thorough
discussion of the casus irreducibilis in relation to purity, cf. [Ara08].
4More precisely, the prime number theorem states that pi (x )x/ log(x ) approaches 1 in the limit, where pi (x) is the number
of primes less than or equal to x .
5Cf. [Gra08], p. 338. For more on purity in arithmetic, cf. [Ara14] and [Arang].
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and best way between two truths of the real domain often passes through the imaginary one” (cf.
[Had45], p. 123). Palle Jorgensen (cf. [Jor15]) has observed that Hadamard, who prefixes this
passage by saying that “it has been written”, is referring to the following passage of Painlevé’s:
The natural development of this study soon led geometers to embrace in their
research imaginary values of variables as well as real values. The theory of Taylor
series, of elliptic functions, the vast doctrine of Cauchy made the fecundity of this
generalization erupt. It appeared that between two truths in the real domain, the
easiest and shortest path often passes through the complex domain. (Cf. [Pai72],
pp. 72–73)
Hadamard and Painlevé presumably had in mind applications of complex analysis in the solution
of dierential equations, in the evaluation of real integrals using residue theory, and in the
solution to arithmetic problems by analytic number theory. Once again, though, there is
ambiguity concerning whether they meant that the “easiest” or “shortest” paths engendered by
complex analysis are easy or short when it comes to verifying proofs or to discovering them.
None of the authors just surveyed seem to have had sharp measures of the type of simplicity
to which they were appealing. Because of their expertise the anecdotal evidence they oer
ought to be taken seriously. However, claims of the sort quoted here are typically given as part
of a broader polemic in which the author is promoting his or her own favored approach to the
topic in question. We thus ought to take their evidence with a grain of salt.
However, we should take their claims very seriously. If true, they would undermine the value
purity has been taken to have by many mathematicians. More precisely, the value of pure proof
would be countered by disadvantages if impure proof is generally or systematically simpler than
pure proof. Toward determining if this is so, the tradeo between the diculty of discovering
impure proofs, and the simplicity impurity allegedly confers, warrants further investigation.
It is thus urgent to formulate claims regarding the simplicity of impure proof relative to pure
proof, so that the theses in question can be better evaluated. We have identified the following
two theses in the reflections we have surveyed:
Thesis 1: Impure proofs are generally simpler to verify than pure proofs of the
same statement.
Thesis 2: Impure proofs are generally simpler to discover than pure proofs of the
same statement.
One way to evaluate these theses would be to undertake a detailed case study of a mathematical
sub-discipline, as Avigad does for number theory in [Avi06], and to evaluate simplicity claims
on the basis of this investigation. An alternate way would be to consider the theses in light
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of work in proof theory.6 In this paper we will undertake the latter kind of evaluation. Each
approach brings dierent information and is valuable for dierent reasons. The chief advantage
of the formal approach is that it permits the theses to be formulated exactly and for those theses
to be evaluated systematically. Its chief disadvantage is that proof-theoretic formulations may
distort the phenomena being measured. We will address this disadvantage as they come to light
in the ensuing discussion. In general we believe that this investigation should be carried out
side-by-side by case study investigations; such investigations may lead to new formal measures
of proof complexity.
As we have explained, these theses, if true, would give reason to discount the value of
purity. This would not be the case if some impure proofs are simpler than pure proofs of the
same theorems; rather, what needs to be investigated is whether there is a general pattern of
improvement of simplicity when moving from pure to impure proof. This article focuses on
Thesis 1; Thesis 2 will be addressed in another article. Our main finding in this article is that
work in proof theory provides little evidence for thinking that there is a general pattern of
improvement of verificational simplicity when moving from pure to impure proof.
3. A FORMAL EVALUATION OF SIMPLICITY OF IMPURE PROOF
In order to investigate Thesis 1, we will focus on the verificational simplicity of theorems
in these theories. We will use as a measure of verificational simplicity the length of proofs in
formal theories. This measure is well-known in proof theory, and accordingly we will be able
to employ theorems of proof theory to evaluate Thesis 1.
Our approach will be to investigate extensions of a given formal theory (which we will
call the “base theory’) by elements that yield, we will argue, impure proofs for theorems of
that base theory. We will consider extensions that are “conservative” in the following rough
sense: anything provable in the extended theory that can be expressed in the language of the
base theory is already provable in the base theory. Thus we can compare the verificational
simplicity of proofs of theorems of the base theory with proofs of those same theorems in an
extended theory. We can thus compare the verificational simplicity of pure and impure proofs
of theorems of the base theory.
Our strategy for this evaluation is as follows. In Section 3.1, we will introduce the formal
theories to be studied here. In Section 3.2, we will argue that the extensions of the base theory
permit impure proofs of theorems of the base theory. In Section 3.3, we will state what is
known concerning the conservativity of these extensions over the base theory. In Section 3.4
we will introduce the aforementioned measure of verificational simplicity, proof length, and an
apparatus for comparing the verificational simplicity of proofs known as “speed-up”. In Section
6Note that in [Avi06] Avigad draws on work from automated reasoning, which is closely allied with proof theory;
thus these approaches are not exclusive.
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3.5 we will state what is known concerning the speed-up of proofs in the extended theory over
proofs of the same theorems in the base theory. Finally, in Section 3.6, we will explain how this
evidence bears on Thesis 1. Since proofs in the extended theories will be seen to be impure in
general for theorems in the base theory, our case will be that the evidence tells against Thesis 1.
3.1. The theories. Our investigations will focus on formal theories of arithmetic. For starters,
first-order Peano Arithmetic (PA) has axioms that define addition, multiplication, and an
ordering of integers, as well as induction axioms given by the familiar induction schema. Its
language LPA consists of constants 0, 1, function symbols +, ×, and relation symbol <. At
the center of our investigations here, however, is the first-order arithmetic theory known as
Primitive Recursive Arithmetic (PRA). PRA is obtained from first-order PA by adding to
PA symbols and defining equations for all primitive recursive functions, and restricting the
induction scheme to quantifier-free formulas.
PRA will serve as our “base theory” in the sense described above: our proof-theoretic
observations will compare proofs of theorems in PRA with proofs of the same theorems in
extensions of PRA. We will consider extensions of PRA of two dierent types, adopting a
helpful classificatory scheme due to Ignjatović (cf. [Ign90] and [CI05]): “arithmetical” and
“conceptual” extensions. These types of theories give proofs of theorems of PRA that are, as we
will argue, impure.
Arithmetical extensions of PRA add new arithmetical principles, specifically induction schemas
for more inclusive classes of arithmetical formulas. We will focus on the arithmetical extension
IΣ1 of PRA, which is obtained from PA by restricting the induction schema to Σ01-formulas.
It is not obvious that IΣ1 is an extension of PRA, since PRA contains function symbols and
defining equations for all the primitive recursive functions, and IΣ1 doesn’t. But it can be shown
that PRA is “essentially” included in IΣ1, as follows (cf. [Sim99], pp. 374–5, for the details).
The language of IΣ1 (i.e. LPA) can be interpreted in the language of PRA by what Simpson
calls the “canonical interpretation”, which (a) interprets 0 and 1 as 0 and 1 in the language
of PRA; (b) interprets addition and multiplication as primitive recursive functions defined in
the expected way; and (c) interprets < by defining predecessor and truncated subtraction as
primitive recursive functions from which < can be straightforwardly defined. It can then be
shown that any first-order formula that is provable in PRA is provable in IΣ1 when given the
canonical interpretation. Moreover, any model of IΣ1 can be expanded to a model of PRA by
interpreting the symbols for the primitive recursive functions according the their definitions.
Since Σ01 induction suces to prove the totality of these functions, the language LPA can be
extended to include these extra symbols while remaining conservative over IΣ1 (cf. [Sim99],
§II.3, pp. 69–73, and [Kay91], Chapter 4).
By contrast, conceptual extensions add to PRA a new type of element, sets, and principles
for using sets. We will focus on three conceptual extensions of PRA: RCA0, WKL0 and
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WKL+0 , each a subsystem of second-order arithmetic. Firstly, the theory RCA0 is obtained by
adding to PRA a comprehension schema for ∆01-definable sets of numbers—that is, a recursive
comprehension schema, hence the name—and replacing PRA’s induction scheme with an
induction schema for Σ01 formulas, possibly with set parameters.
7 Secondly, WKL0 is the theory
RCA0 augmented by weak König’s lemma, which yields paths through infinite {0, 1}-trees.
Thirdly, WKL+0 is the theoryWKL0 augmented by a form of the Baire category theorem saying
that every arithmetically defined sequence of dense open sets of Cantor space has non-empty
intersection.
3.2. Impurity. Next, we will argue that each of these extensions of PRA yields impure proofs
of theorems of PRA. Firstly, proofs of theorems of PRA in conceptual extensions of PRA are, in
general, topically impure, because they draw on set-theoretic resources rather than just resources
concerning natural numbers. Theorems of PRA, a first-order theory of arithmetic, are theorems
about natural numbers and not sets: in particular, its quantifiers range over objects of arithmetic
rather than set-theoretic type. While PRA also uses functions and relations on numbers, these
functions can be understood algorithmically, without appeal to set theory. We see no good
reason to think that a set-theoretic understanding of functions takes precedence, particularly in
the case of PRA where the functions are merely used for computations on natural numbers.
One might object to this on the following grounds, following a suggestion of SeanWalsh. By
the same reasoning, proofs of theorems of IΣ1 in RCA0 are also topically impure, since they too
deploy set-theoretic resources for proving arithmetic theorems. But IΣ1 and RCA0 are mutually
interpretable. Thus, we can translate any proof in RCA0 into a proof in IΣ1, and thus into a
proof that avoids set-theoretic resources; and this translations is line-by-line, as straightforward
as it gets. Thus, one might maintain, the impurity of proofs in RCA0 of theorems of IΣ1 is a
mirage; proofs in RCA0 use set-theoretic resources only in a superficial way, that can easily be
expressed in non-set-theoretic ways, without any significant gain in length of proof.
This objection can be expressed more sharply, taking a cue fromWright in a slightly-dierent
context:
Well, I imagine it will be granted that to define the distinctively arithmetical
concepts is so to define a range of expressions that the use thereby laid down
for those expressions is indistinguishable from that of expressions which do
indeed express those concepts. The interpretability of Peano arithmetic within
Fregean arithmetic ensures that has already been accomplished as far as all pure
arithmetical uses are concerned. (Cf. [Wri99], pp. 17–18; [HW01], p. 322)
7In [Sim99], Simpson defines RCA0 (on p. 24) in a slightly dierent but equivalent way, using Σ01-induction (with
set parameters) but not primitive recursion. As he notes on p. 73, Friedman originally defined RCA0 in the way
we have done here; cf. [Fri76], pp. 557–8.
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A topically pure proof of a theorem draws only on what belongs to the content of the theorem;
following Wright, one could maintain that this includes concepts whose use is indistinguishable
from that of concepts that feature in the statement of the theorem. Since the mutual inter-
pretability of IΣ1 and RCA0 entails that the use of set-theoretic concepts in an RCA0-proof
of a IΣ1-theorem is indistinguishable, in a precise sense, from the use of purely arithmetical
resources, the objection asserts that an RCA0-proof of a IΣ1-theorem is in fact topically pure.
In reply, let’s consider an agent P , a relative logical novice who is familiar with IΣ1 but not
RCA0, because she does not know any set theory. She can understand theorems of IΣ1 and
IΣ1-proofs of these theorems, but not RCA0-proofs of them. The objector maintains that he
can translate any IΣ1-proof into an RCA0-proof, but P does not understand the translated
versions. The objector may reply that P “implicitly” understands the parts (terms, sentences) of
the RCA0-proof she purports not to understand, since she understands the parts of the IΣ1-proof
from which they have been translated. But P does not understand this translatability, since she
does not know RCA0. The objector may then reply that the type of “implicit" understanding
of RCA0-proofs intended here is not psychological, but rather semantic: that the meanings of
the parts of RCA0-proofs are the same as the meanings of the parts of IΣ1-proofs. By virtue
of mutual interpretability, parts of RCA0-proofs play the same inferential role in proofs of
IΣ1-theorems as parts of IΣ1-proofs. They thus have the same use, and hence the same meaning.
Call thisWright’s thesis. It follows, the objection goes, that agent P does in fact understand the
parts of RCA0-proofs she purports not to understand, since she understands their translations
into IΣ1.
Whatever the virtues of Wright’s thesis otherwise, its application to mathematics dissolves
important aspects of mathematical practice, and thus impairs our ability to understand this
practice. For suppose we admit Wright’s thesis, maintaining that if two theories T1 and T2 are
mutually interpretable, then their semantic parts (terms, statements) have identical meanings.
Hilbert showed that the theory of fields is mutually interpretable (with parameters) with the
theory of Pappian projective planes (cf. [Hil99]). Thus purely geometric talk of projective planes
can be term-by-term translated back and forth with purely algebraic talk of fields. Wright’s
thesis entails that this purely geometric talk and this purely algebraic talk have the same meaning.
This goes against five hundred years of thinking in mathematics, where algebraic thinking
and geometric thinking have been thought to be distinct (as discussed in Section 2). If the
semantic boundary between algebra and geometry is dissolved, then topical purity for algebra
and geometry is also dissolved, since topical purity is a semantic view as well. But topical purity
has been and remains today important to mathematical practice, as we explained earlier and in
several other referenced articles as well. Dissolving the semantic boundary between algebra
and geometry would dissolve topical purity as a genuine constraint of mathematical practice,
and would thus impair our ability to understand mathematical practice. That is too high a price
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to pay for a controversial semantic view like Wright’s thesis. Thus we reject Wright’s thesis
and maintain, against the objection, that RCA0-proofs of IΣ1-theorem are in general topically
impure.
We next turn to the impurity of arithmetical extensions of PRA. This case is dierent than
for conceptual extensions of PRA, because arithmetical extensions do not add set-theoretic
resources to PRA. Thus they do not engender proofs that are obviously topically impure for
PRA. Instead, these extensions add stronger induction principles than PRA. These principles
are, as we will argue, less elementary than the quantifier-free induction of PRA, and thus proofs
of theorems of PRA in conceptual extensions of PRA are, in general, elementally impure.
We focus on proofs of theorems of PRA using Σ1-induction rather than just PRA’s quantifier-
free induction; that’s to say, proofs that may apply the induction schema of PRA to Σ01-formulas
rather than just to quantifier-free formulas. Tait has argued that the finitist accepts quantifier-
free induction, on constructive grounds, while not accepting Σ1-induction (cf. [Tai81]). That’s
because there need be no way of constructing the existential witness of the conclusion of
Σ1-induction from the witnesses for the existential formulas in the antecedent clauses.
As a result, the finitist maintains that proofs using quantifier-free induction are (all else being
equal) more secure than proofs using Σ1-induction. Taking epistemic security as a criterion of
elementarity, it follows that Σ1-inductive proofs of theorems of PRA are elementally impure.
Proofs of theorems of PRA using Σ1-induction involve a redeployment of PRA’s conceptual
resources that does not meet the epistemic standards that the principles of PRA are taken to
meet, and hence are elementally impure.
As the reference to finitism suggests, Hilbert arguably held a view of purity like this, at least
in his later years (for discussions of Hilbert’s earlier views on purity, see [Hal08], [AM12] and
[Ara08]). As Kreisel described it, Hilbert’s “famous consistency programme is also a particular
case of this search for pure methods: so-called finitist theorems should have finitist proofs”
(cf. [Kre80], p. 163). Hilbert characterized the “real” propositions of “ordinary finite number
theory” as those that can be “developed through the construction of numbers by means solely
of intuitive contentual considerations” that are basic “for mathematics and, in general, for all
scientific thinking, understanding, and communication.” (cf. [Hil25], p. 376). As he saw it,
such “real” propositions, being “immediately intuitive and directly intelligible”, were more
securely knowable than “ideal” propositions which are non-contentual and are “merely things
that are governed by our rules” (cf. [Hil25], p. 380). Hence, he judged, real propositions are best
proved by real rather than ideal methods. Thus, we agree with Kreisel that Hilbert’s program is
a program for purity, in particular for elemental purity.8
8A significant remaining question is whether IΣ1 is especially significant, as an arithmetical extension of PRA, for
the thesis that impurity generally oers gains of eciency; or whether a study of IΣ2, for instance, would oer
key additional insights. Toward this, Ignjatović has conjectured that further inductive strengthenings of PRA
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Here too one could raise an objection. Friedman has conjectured that every arithmetical
theorem already proved in the Annals of Mathematics can be proved in the theory known
as elementary function arithmetic (EFA), which is proof-theoretically weaker than PRA (cf.
[Avi03]). If true, one might infer that elemental purity is a trivial constraint: every arithmetic
theorem has an elementally pure proof, indeed a very elementally pure proof. In reply, we
observe firstly that Friedman’s “grand” conjecture is far from certain. At the moment an
active research program is aimed at showing that Fermat’s Last Theorem is provable in EFA
(cf. [McL10]), but even this modest step toward Friedman’s conjecture is a long way from
being settled. Secondly, even if true, the conjecture says nothing about the length of proofs of
arithmetic theorems in EFA. One would expect them to be much longer in general. There
are thus two notions of elementarity at play here: on the one hand, inductive strength, and
on the other hand, length of proof. These seem to be in conflict with one another: if the
conjecture is correct, then every arithmetic theorem has an elementally pure proof in the sense
of inductive strength, but not necessarily in the sense of length of proof. Thus the conjecture,
if true, would lead to an investigation of the length of proof of arithmetic theorems in EFA
versus in inductively stronger arithmetic theories. This is precisely the sort of investigation to
be carried out in this article for other theories, so the conjecture would simply necessitate a
sequel to this article, rather than refuting its points.
3.3. Conservativity. Having argued that arithmetic and conceptual extensions of PRA are in
general impure, we now turn to the question of their conservativity over PRA. Recall that a
theory T2 is conservative over a theory T1 i for every sentence φ in the language of T1 that is
provable in T2, φ is also provable in T1. Each of these extensions of PRA are conservative over
PRA. The arithmetic extension IΣ1 is conservative over PRA for Π02 sentences, as shown by
Parsons (cf. [Par70]). Since RCA0 and IΣ1 prove the same first-order sentences (cf. [Sim99],
pp. 25, 369), it follows again from Parsons’ result that RCA0 is conservative over PRA for
Π02 sentences. Friedman observed that WKL0 is conservative over PRA for Π
0
2 sentences, and
Harrington has shown that WKL0 is conservative over RCA0 for Π11 sentences, and hence for
all arithmetical sentences (cf. [Sim99], pp. 369–372). Finally, Brown and Simpson have shown
that WKL+0 is conservative over RCA0 for Π
1
1 sentences (cf. [BS93]).
3.4. Speed-up. To compare the eciency of proofs of theorems of PRA with proofs of these
same theorems in conservative extensions of PRA, we consider the “speed-up” of proofs in
extensions of PRA. Proof theorists measure the complexity of a system of proof by the “speed-up”
that one system of proof oers over another. By calling a theory T2 a “speed-up” of a theory T1,
we mean that all the theorems ofT1, perhaps restricted to those of a given type, have significantly
more ecient proofs in T2, measured in terms of length of proof.
with respect to the quantifier-free theorems of PRA will yield a significant gain of eciency, but to the best of our
knowledge this is still open.
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Proof theorists distinguish between two types of speed-ups—polynomial and super-polynomial—
the former being regarded as relatively insignificant, the latter as relatively significant. Suppose
T1,T2 are two theories such that T2 ⊂ T1. We say that T1 is at most a polynomial speed-up of T2
when for every φ provable in T2, the length of the shortest proof (measured in terms of total
number of symbol occurrences) of φ in T2 is less than some fixed polynomial multiple of the
length of the shortest proof of φ in T1. This notion can be relativized as follows. Let Φ be a set
of formulas provable in T2. We say that T1 is at most a polynomial speed-up of T2 with respect
to Φ when for every φ ∈ Φ, the length of the shortest proof of φ in T2 is less than some fixed
polynomial multiple of the length of the shortest proof of φ in T1.9
Polynomial speed-up is distinguished from a particular type of non-polynomial speed-up
called roughly super-exponential speed-up. This is speed-up by a function that grows much more
rapidly than a polynomial function.10 T1 is said to have a roughly super-exponential speed-up over
T2 when for every φ provable in T2, the length of the shortest proof in T2 of φ is a “roughly
super-exponential multiple” of the length of the shortest proof of φ in T1. This notion can
also be relativized as follows. For a set Φ of formulas provable in T2, T1 is a super-exponential
speed-up of T2 with respect to Φ when the lengths of the shortest T2-proofs of the various φi in Φ
are “roughly super-exponential multiples” of the shortest T1-proofs of those same φi .11
9Polynomial speed-up may be more carefully defined as follows (cf. [CI05], pp. 4–5). Let the length `(pi ) of a
proof pi be the number of symbol occurrences in pi . For any formula φ, let pi<Ti (φ) be the shortest proof (in terms of
number of symbol occurrences) of φ in Ti . We say that T1 is at most a polynomial speed-up of T2 with respect to Φ if
there is a polynomial p(x) with natural number coecients such that for every φ provable in T2
`(pi<T2 (φ)) < p(`(pi<T1 (φ))).
10This can be defined precisely as follows. Firstly, a function f (x) eventually dominates a function д(x) if there is
anm such that for all n > m, f (n) ≥ д(n). Secondly, let 2xm be the function defined by: 2n0 = n, 2nm+1 = 22
n
m . For
example, 2n1 = 2
2n0 = 2n , 2n2 = 2
2n1 = 22n , 2n3 = 2
2n2 = 222
n
, and so on. A function f (x) has Kalmar elementary growth
rate if there is anm such that 2xm eventually dominates f (x). It turns out that 2xx is the first function that dominates
all Kalmar elementary functions. A function f (x) has roughly super-exponential growth rate if and only if (i) it does
not have Kalmar elementary growth rate, but (ii) there is a polynomial p(x) with natural number coecients such
that p(2xx ) eventually dominates it.11Roughly super-exponential speed-up may be more carefully defined as follows (cf. [CI05], pp. 4–5). T1 has
roughly super-exponential speed-up over T2 if and only if
(1) there is no function f (x) with Kalmar elementary growth rate such that for every φ provable in T2,
`(pi<T2 (φ)) < f (`(pi<T1 (φ))); and
(2) there is a function д(x) with roughly super-exponential growth rate such that for every φ provable in T2,
`(pi<T2 (φ)) < д(`(pi<T1 (φ))).
For Φ a set of formulas provable in T2, T1 has roughly super-exponential speed-up over T2 with respect to Φ if and
only if there is a sequence {φi : i ∈ ω} of formulas from Φ such that
(1) there is no function f (x) with Kalmar elementary growth rate such that for every φn ∈ Φ, `(pi<T2 (φn)) <
f (`(pi<T1 (φn))); and
(2) there is a functionд(x)with roughly super-exponential growth rate such that for everyφn ∈ Φ, `(pi<T2 (φn)) <
д(`(pi<T1 (φn))).
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This distinction between types of speed-ups is important because, as we said earlier, polyno-
mial speed-up is generally regarded as relatively insignificant, while super-exponential speed-up
is regarded as relatively significant. The case for the significance of polynomial-time com-
putability as a measure of eciency seems to have been first made by Edmonds in [Edm65],
and was quickly adopted as the standard view in computer science and proof theory (cf. [FH03]
and [Dea15], §2.2). Edmonds writes that its significance is clear in practice; he cites the graph-
theoretic work of organic chemists as a case where polynomial-time complexity is obviously
superior to super-polynomial-time complexity (p. 451). Similarly, Parikh writes of “feasible”
proofs and proofs of “reasonable length” as being intuitive notions that he identifies with non-
super-polynomial complexity, appealing to “common sense” (cf. [Par71], p. 494). We follow
this practice here.
3.5. The evidence. The following is known regarding speed-up with respect to the theories
we have considered.
(1) IΣ1 has a roughly super-exponential speed-up over PRA with respect to the Π01 theorems
of PRA. This was shown by Ignjatović [CI05].
(2) RCA0 has at most a polynomial speed-up over IΣ1 with respect to first-order arithmetical
formulas. This is folklore, following from the existence of the “canonical interpretation”
of RCA0 into IΣ1 that we gave earlier.
(3) WKL0 has at most a polynomial speed-up over RCA0 with respect to Π11 sentences, and
hence for first-order arithmetical formulas. This was shown by Hájek [Háj93] and, by
other means, Avigad [Avi96].
(4) WKL+0 has at most a polynomial speed-up over WKL0 with respect to Π
1
1 sentences,
and hence for first-order arithmetical formulas. This was shown by Avigad [Avi96].
Thus the arithmetic extension IΣ1 has significant speed-up over PRA, but the conceptual
extensions RCA0, WKL0 and WKL+0 do not yield further significant speed-up.
It is reasonable to wonder whether, as we move further up this chain of theories from RCA0
through WKL+0 and beyond, we will find another conceptual extension of PRA that yields a
significant speed-up. Yokoyama has proved that there is a maximal such conceptual extension
of RCA0 (cf. [Yok10]), though his proof does not yield the identity of this theory, only its
existence12 ; and has conjectured that no such conceptual extension of RCA0 oers more than
polynomial speed-up. By “such” a conceptual extension of RCA0, and by “this chain of theories”,
we mean Π12-axiomatizable theories, like WKL0 and WKL
+
0 .
13 By a “maximal” such theory,
12He suggests as a possibility WKL+0 +COH, where COH asserts the existence of a cohesive set, having shown




1-conservative extension of RCA0 (Corollary 2.5).13That WKL0 and WKL+0 are Π
1
2-axiomatizable can be seen by inspecting the logical form of their axioms. That
they are not Π11-axiomatizable follows, respectively, from Harrington’s result that WKL0 is Π
1
1-conservative over
RCA0 and from Brown and Simpson’s result that WKL+0 is Π
1
1-conservative over RCA0. To see why for the case
of WKL0, note that we can write WKL0 as RCA0 + φ. If WKL0 were Π11-axiomatizable, then there would be a
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we mean a theory that logically implies any other Π12-axiomatizable Π
1
1-conservative extension
of RCA0. At present, all our known methods of producing conservative extensions of RCA0
rely on the Π12-axiomatizability of the extension. Unless new methods of finding conservative
extensions of RCA0 were to be located, a positive answer to Yokoyama’s conjecture would
indicate that no other conceptual extension of PRA should be expected to yield significant gains
in eciency of proof length.
3.6. Evaluating the evidence. What, if anything, do these findings mean concerning the
relative advantages of pure and impure proof? The only clear message is that they do not provide
evidence of a general pattern of improvement in eciency in moving from pure to impure
proof. The move from IΣ1 to RCA0, for example, is a move in the direction of topical impurity,
we have argued. It does not correspond, however, to significant shortenings of proofs.
This is neither to deny nor to ignore IΣ1’s roughly super-exponential speed-up over PRA.
Rather, it is to say, firstly, that the impurity of proofs in IΣ1 of theorems of PRA is a matter of
elemental impurity rather than topical impurity; and secondly, that it does not imply a general
pattern of speed-up in moving from pure to impure proof.
Furthermore, one may reasonably question the relevance of these formal results to the types
of gains of simplicity described by MacLaurin, d’Alembert and Painlevé, as discussed in Section
2. No one has ever said, “Proving things in PRA is hard, but is made so much easier by working
in IΣ1.” But the claims about purity and simplicity from mathematical practice do make claims
like this. Thus, whatever kinds of gains in simplicity may be aorded by moving from purity
to impurity, the speed-up of proofs in IΣ1 for theorems of PRA does not seem to shed light on
those gains.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Length of proof is a familiar measure of simplicity in proof theory, though one must be
sensitive to what exactly this measure is not measuring. As has been frequently observed, proof
length is a crude and possibly misleading measure of proof complexity. For instance, Potter
has pointed out that proof length is highly dependent on choices of means of expression (cf.
[Pot04], pp. 234–236). He notes a recent result showing that the term expressing the cardinal
number 1 in Bourbaki’s 1954 formal system has approximately 1012 characters, when fully
expanded; and that when in the fourth edition of the same book ordered pairs (a,b) are defined
in Kuratowski’s way as {{a}, {a,b}}, instead of taken as a primitive as in the earlier editions,
the term for 1 has approximately 1054 characters (cf. [Mat02]). Intuitively, the introduction
Π11 theory T such that T is equivalent to WKL0. Since RCA0 is finitely axiomatizable, RCA0 + φ is equivalent to
a single sentence that, by compactness, is provable in a finite subtheory of T that can be conjoined into a single
sentence ψ . Hence RCA0 proves the equivalence of ψ and φ. Since WKL0 proves ψ , it follows by Harrington’s
conservation result that RCA0 provesψ , and thus that RCA0 proves φ, contradicting the fact that WKL0 is properly
stronger than RCA0. For WKL+0 the argument is similar, using Brown and Simpson’s result instead.
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of a single instance of an ordered pair should not make a proof significantly more complex,
but this result suggests that it may. As a result Potter councils caution in using proof length as
a measure of proof complexity. He recommends using, in addition to length, “elegance and
perspicuity” to judge the improvement in complexity of a proof using higher-order methods,
noting that these “are of course much less objective than mere length and hence less amenable
to formal study.”
Avigad remarks, similarly:
[L]ength has something to do with explaining how infinitary methods can
make a proof simpler and more comprehensible. But the advantages of working
in a conservative extension seem to have as much to do with the perspicuity
and naturality of the notions involved, and using the number of symbols in an
uninterpreted derivation as the sole measure of complexity is unlikely to provide
useful insight. (cf. [Avi03], p. 276n18)
Relevant to this is Caldon and Ignjatović’s suggestion that moving up the chain of theories
we have been discussing, from PRA through RCA0 to WKL0 and WKL+0 , may result in what
he calls “conceptual speed-up”. That is, it may produce proofs that are generally clearer and
easier to grasp than those of their predecessors. If this were correct (and though it may be
plausible, Caldon and Ignjatović provide no reason to think it is), then this hierarchy of theories
would be a reasonable basis for a formal investigation of perspicuity in mathematical proof. On
the other hand, proofs in these formal systems are not necessarily all that simple. As Simpson
has remarked (cf. [Sim88], p. 361), proofs in WKL0, or WKL+0 are “sometimes much more
complicated than the standard proof.”
Avigad also stresses a dierent but closely related matter. In [Avi03] he notes that a great
deal of mathematics can be formalized in the theories IΣ1, PRA, RCA0, etc. that we have been
discussing, as well as in yet weaker theories. Avigad notes that Takeuti was able to formalize
enough complex analysis in a conservative extension of PA to permit the formalization of
the complex-analytic proofs of the prime number theorem of Hadamard and de la Vallée
Poussin. Indeed it was later shown that IΣ1 suces for this (cf. [Sud01]). Also, Cornaros and
Dimitracopoulos were able to formalize Selberg’s “elementary” proof in a subtheory of IΣ1 (cf.
[CD94]).
Yet, as Avigad notes, both the classical and the elementary proofs are formalizable in the
same weak theory, IΣ1. This indicates, he suggests, that whatever dierence in complexity
there is between the two proofs is not detectable merely by determining how much logical
strength is needed to prove it. As he puts it (p. 274), “it is a mistake to confuse mathematical
diculty with logical strength; in other words. . . there is a dierence between saying that a
proof is hard, and saying that it requires strong axioms.”
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We agree with this point, though it runs somewhat orthogonally to our narrative in this paper.
Our formal investigation has centered on the gains of general proof eciency, measured in terms
of length, in moving from logically weaker to stronger formal theories of arithmetic. Avigad’s
point is that the weaker/stronger distinction does not map very well onto the pure/impure
distinction as realized in ordinary mathematics. We agree, but our goal in this paper has been
to see how far we can get in our investigation of purity and complexity using just the means
available in proof theory as it presently exists. Hence, we have considered various set-theoretic
extensions of PRA that can be viewed as having added some additional impurity, and tried to
say to what extent that additional impurity purchases a gain of simplicity. Our conclusion has
been that there is no general gain in simplicity purchased by this move, at least for simplicity
measured in terms of proof length.
Returning, finally, to the issues raised in Section 2, our conclusion concerns only what we
have called Thesis 1, that impure proofs are generally simpler to verify than pure proofs of the
same statement. The results from proof theory discussed here do not bear on Thesis 2, that
impure proofs are generally simpler to discover than pure proofs of the same statement. Thesis
2 may seem to be more pertinent to understanding mathematical practice than Thesis 1; it is
arguably a better expression of the types of gains of simplicity described earlier by MacLaurin,
d’Alembert and Painlevé. We agree with this point. Proof theory is a flawed measure of proof
complexity, particularly so for analyzing proofs in mathematical practice. However, at the
moment it is the best we have, and these results at least give us some data for philosophical
reflexion. A measure of inventional simplicity would be great to have, in order to analyze more
fully the simplicity of impurity in practice, but at the moment we do not have such a measure.
Thus, the results of this article are but a start, and we hope they may stimulate further work.
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